- replace inventory/dmc12.yml with cloudlorean.yml (+ group_vars) and update all README/AGENTS call examples and the inventory table - move admin_password hash into encrypted vault.yml; remove plaintext copies from roles/bootstrap/defaults and group_vars/external.yml - bootstrap.yml loads vault.yml via vars_files (same pattern as monitoring) - monitoring: PSK config/registration updates, docker role defaults, os-updates logging/reboot refinements, ansible.cfg/execute.sh tweaks - add .project-wiki knowledge base and .github agent instructions
70 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
70 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: TECH-SECURITY
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type: technical
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status: active
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title: Security
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created: '2026-09-09'
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updated: '2026-09-09'
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tags:
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- technical
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- security
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related:
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- ALERT-20260909-001
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- ALERT-20260909-002
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- NFR-002
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- MOD-003
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- MOD-007
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source_paths:
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- vault.yml
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- roles/monitoring/tasks/configure-psk.yml
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- roles/bootstrap/defaults/main.yml
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- ansible.cfg
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confidence: confirmed
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---
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# Security
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## Secrets Handling
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- `vault.yml` (tracked, encrypted) holds `admin_password` (SHA-512 hash),
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`monitoring_zabbix_api_password`, and Proxmox credentials
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(`PROXMOX_USER_NAME`, `PROXMOX_USER_PASS`); it is loaded via playbook-level
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`vars_files` in `bootstrap.yml` and `playbooks/monitoring.yml`.
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- Git-ignored (verified): `.vault_pass`, `setenv.sh` (Proxmox credentials),
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`.zabbix-psk/` (per-host PSKs), `logs/`.
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- Resolved 2026-09-09: the `admin_password` SHA-512 hash that was committed
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in plaintext in `roles/bootstrap/defaults/main.yml` and
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`inventory/group_vars/external.yml` was moved to encrypted `vault.yml`
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(see [ALERT-20260909-001](../alerts/ALERT-20260909-001.md)).
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## SSH Posture
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- Controller/transport: `host_key_checking = False`,
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`StrictHostKeyChecking=no`, `UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null` (ansible.cfg,
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execute.sh, Dockerfile). Deliberate for first-time provisioning; README
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explicitly warns to restrict this in production.
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- Host hardening: `manage-ssh-keys` role enforces allow/deny key lists;
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bootstrap deploys hardened `sshd.conf.j2` and per-host authorized keys.
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- Per-host exceptions: `ssh_service_name: ssh` on `gitea`/`ipam`.
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## Zabbix Agent TLS
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- PSK-only encryption (TLS connect + accept), 256-bit PSKs generated with
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`openssl rand -hex 32` on the controller, persisted with umask 077 in a
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0700 directory, deployed 0600 to the agent host. Identity = host name.
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## Risky Defaults (documented trade-offs)
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- `hawser_allow_insecure_no_auth: true` - Hawser standard mode without token
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on non-loopback addresses; comment in defaults demands other network
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protections.
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- `execute.sh` disables host key checking inside the runtime container.
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- Mirror rewrite runs with `ignore_errors: true` in os-updates.
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## Git Hygiene
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- Resolved 2026-09-09: the previously uncommitted change set (including the
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`dmc12` → `cloudlorean` inventory rename and stale documentation) was
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committed as one coherent change; see
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[ALERT-20260909-002](../alerts/ALERT-20260909-002.md).
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