---
id: SCAN-20260909
type: scan-report
status: active
title: Codebase Scan 2026-09-09
created: 2026-09-09
updated: 2026-09-09
tags: [scan]
related: [PROJECT, TECH-CODEBASE-MAP, TECH-ARCHITECTURE, ALERT-20260909-001, ALERT-20260909-002]
source_paths:
- README.md
- AGENTS.md
- ansible.cfg
- bootstrap.yml
- execute.sh
- docker/
- inventory/
- playbooks/
- roles/
confidence: confirmed
---

# Codebase Scan 2026-09-09

## Scope

Root configuration (`ansible.cfg`, `execute.sh`), Docker runtime
(`docker/`), all inventories and group_vars, all 6 playbooks plus
`bootstrap.yml`, and all 7 roles (`tasks/`, `defaults/`, `templates/`,
`handlers/`). Git history inspected for inventory renames. Vault-encrypted
files (`vault.yml`) were not decrypted.

## Confirmed Findings

### Project Shape

- Central Ansible collection for provisioning, hardening, updating, and
  monitoring Debian hosts; 7 roles, 1 top-level playbook (`bootstrap.yml`)
  and 5 playbooks under `playbooks/`.
- Execution environment: Docker image `ansible:deb13` built from
  `debian:trixie-slim` with `ansible-core~=2.20.6`; collections pinned in
  `docker/requirements.yml` (`ansible.posix` 2.2.0, `community.general`
  13.0.1, `community.docker` 5.2.0, `community.zabbix` 4.2.0).
- `execute.sh` creates an IPv6-enabled bridge network `ansible-dualstack`,
  starts an interactive container with the repo mounted at `/ansible` and an
  `ansible_ssh_keys` volume at `/root/.ssh`, injects SSH client config with
  host-key checking disabled, then attaches.
- `ansible.cfg`: `host_key_checking = False`, `roles_path = ./roles`,
  `forks = 20`, `gathering = smart`, `internal_poll_interval = 0.001`,
  SSH pipelining and `ControlPersist=60s`, known hosts set to `/dev/null`.

### Playbooks

- All playbooks run `hosts: all`, `user: admin`, `become: true`, and start
  with a Debian `os_family` guard that fails non-Debian hosts.
- Exception: `playbooks/hardening/manage-ssh-keys.yml` has **no** Debian
  guard, no `become`, and no `vars_files`; it binds the `manage-ssh-keys`
  role directly.
- `playbooks/monitoring.yml` loads `../vault.yml` via a playbook-relative
  path; other playbooks do not load vault.yml explicitly.
- `playbooks/os-updates-deb.yml` chains `os-updates` then `healthcheck`
  (post-update quality gate).

### Roles

- `bootstrap`: subtasks for basic packages, admin user (+sudo, authorized
  keys), MOTD, keyboard layout, OpenSSH install/config/keys, bashrc, sysctl;
  then composes the `docker` role (skippable via `skip_docker`) and the
  `monitoring` role (skippable via `skip_monitoring`). Tags: `motd`, `ssh`,
  `bashrc`, `sysctl`.
- `docker`: official Docker apt repository + `docker-ce`, CLI,
  `containerd.io`, buildx and compose plugins; template
  `sources.list.j2`; codename derived from facts.
- `os-updates`: optional mirror rewrite (`os_also_update_mirror`, deb822 +
  legacy templates, codename whitelist `trixie|bookworm|bullseye`), full apt
  upgrade, kernel-comparison reboot decision with async reboot +
  `wait_for_connection` (600s timeout), reboot **deferred** on hosts in the
  `proxmox` group unless `os_update_reboot_on_proxmox` is true, LXC hosts
  skip kernel/reboot logic; preflight/postflight logging delegated to the
  controller (`logs/<inventory>/<hostname>/update.log`).
- `healthcheck`: compares `docker ps -a` vs running containers, writes a
  `quality_gate` section into the same update log, fails the play when
  `healthcheck_fail_on_unhealthy` is true (default false).
- `monitoring`: Zabbix 7.0 release package from repo.zabbix.com,
  `zabbix-agent2`, Docker plugin config when socket exists, per-host PSK
  generated on the controller (persisted in `.zabbix-psk/<hostname>.psk`,
  mode 0700, `openssl rand -hex 32`), deployed to `/etc/zabbix/
  zabbix_agent2.psk` (0600), TLS connect/accept = PSK, and API host
  registration via `community.zabbix.zabbix_host` over httpapi with
  template union including `Docker by Zabbix agent 2` when the Docker socket
  is present.
- `hawser`: requires existing Docker host + compose file at
  `/opt/hawser/docker-compose.yml`, re-renders it from template, then
  `docker_compose_v2` with `pull: always`.
- `manage-ssh-keys`: ensures `~/.ssh` (0700), adds `good_keys`, removes
  `bad_keys` from the admin user's authorized keys.

### Inventories And Variables

- `inventory/cloudlorean.yml` (untracked): site with groups `debian` (13
  hosts, 192.168.212.0/24) and `proxmox` (`dmc12` 192.168.212.10,
  `pbs` 192.168.212.11); per-host `ssh_service_name: ssh` on `gitea` and
  `ipam`.
- `inventory/home.yml`: site `home`, 6 Debian hosts + `tardis` (Proxmox),
  10.13.37.0/24.
- `inventory/external.yml`: 4 IPv6-only Debian hosts.
- `inventory/dmc12.yml` is **deleted in the working tree but not committed**
  (`git status: D`); `inventory/cloudlorean.yml` and
  `inventory/group_vars/cloudlorean.yml` are untracked. Git history confirms
  `dmc12.yml` was added in `d2e8ce4` and never tracked as renamed.
- group_vars per site override Zabbix servers, API URL
  (`https://mon.cloudlorean.de/api_jsonrpc.php`), proxy
  (`gatekeeper.cloudlorean.de` / `gatekeeper.meyer-kempen.de`), host groups
  and templates. `group_vars/debian.yml` hardcodes
  `os_update_version_codename: "trixie"` (AGENTS.md warns about this).
- `admin_authorized_keys` and the SHA-512 `admin_password` hash appear in
  **plaintext** in `roles/bootstrap/defaults/main.yml` and
  `inventory/group_vars/external.yml` (see ALERT-20260909-001).
- `vault.yml` is tracked but encrypted; `.vault_pass`, `setenv.sh`,
  `.zabbix-psk/`, `logs/` are git-ignored (verified via `git check-ignore`).

## Inferred Findings

- The environment formerly called `dmc12` was renamed to `cloudlorean`;
  host `dmc12` is now a Proxmox node within the `cloudlorean` site
  (confidence: inferred from logs/.zabbix-psk paths and git status).
- Operators appear to be "Niklas" and "Dennis" (SSH key comments in
  bootstrap defaults). Formal ownership not documented.
- All sites share one Zabbix server (`mon.cloudlorean.de`) with optional
  per-site proxies (confidence: inferred from group_vars).
- Home site is referred to as "Meyer-Kempen" in Zabbix host groups/proxy
  name (confidence: inferred).

## Unknowns

- Whether `vault.yml` also defines `admin_password` (overriding the
  committed defaults hash) - vault not decrypted.
- Whether `monitoring_zabbix_passive_servers` in
  `inventory/group_vars/external.yml` (`2a01:4f8:1c1e:62dd::1`, the
  `healthcheck` host's own address) is intentional (Zabbix server/proxy on
  that host) or a misconfiguration.
- Which Docker template name exists on the Zabbix server: role default
  `Docker by Zabbix agent2` vs group_vars `Docker by Zabbix agent 2`.
- Formal stakeholders and success criteria beyond the healthcheck gate.

## Important Paths

- `bootstrap.yml`, `playbooks/*.yml` - entrypoints
- `roles/bootstrap/`, `roles/docker/`, `roles/monitoring/`,
  `roles/os-updates/`, `roles/healthcheck/`, `roles/hawser/`,
  `roles/manage-ssh-keys/` - role implementations
- `roles/*/README.md` - per-role documentation (documentation duty)
- `inventory/*.yml`, `inventory/group_vars/*.yml` - host data
- `docker/Dockerfile`, `docker/requirements.yml`, `execute.sh` - runtime
- `vault.yml` (encrypted), `.vault_pass`, `setenv.sh`, `.zabbix-psk/`,
  `logs/` - secrets and audit artifacts (git-ignored except vault.yml)

## Suggested Wiki Updates

- Populated during this scan: technical docs (architecture, codebase map,
  module docs, integrations, security, deployment, testing), requirement
  records, open questions reconciliation, alerts ALERT-20260909-001 /
  ALERT-20260909-002, traceability maps, indexes, REGISTRY.yml, STATUS.md.